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ABSTRACT This article examines the development of a gender mainstreaming
strategy in the EU by illustrating how this strategy was shaped by other than
gender equality policy goals. Gender mainstreaming was originally launched in
1996 to promote gender equality in all EU policies, in the context of international
and European mobilization on women’s issues. It was aimed to transform main-
stream policies by introducing a gender equality perspective. However, it has been
largely used as an alibi for neutralizing positive action. The successful implemen-
tation of positive action in political decision-making had challenged the gender
distribution of political power over policy institutions and technical, human and
financial resources. This led to policy softening and institutional weakening due
to counteracting by the EU political and administrative hierarchies. The argument
is based on text analyses of relevant Community acts and on direct observations
of the policy process, based on personal working experiences in the European
Commission.
KEY WORDS European Commission ◆ gender equality policies ◆ gender
mainstreaming ◆ positive action ◆ women in political decision-making
INTRODUCTION
The article aims to contribute to the debate about the development of EU
gender mainstreaming (GM) strategies by examining the context of its
emergence in the mid-1990s. It is argued that the launch and rapid expan-
sion of GM in the EU were largely shaped by the outcome of the conflict
between two different policy frames of GM. One frame concerns its trans-
formative role in public policies, complementing and reinforcing positive
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action and equality legislation. This frame was promoted as the central
element of an EU hegemonic rhetoric at the World Conference on Women
in 1995 and backed up by feminist theorists, women’s organizations and
institutions. The second frame presents GM as an alternative gender
equality tool, which would gradually make positive action in favour of
women redundant and which could be used to serve other policy goals.
This frame was promoted by a number of key EU policy-makers and
political forces within the EU who did not support the goal of de facto
gender equality. The article shows that the policy outcome of the conflict,
in the short term, was harmful to positive action in most EU policy areas,
while in the long term it proved helpful in policy areas where gender
equality coincided with other EU priorities, such as economic priorities of
the European Employment Strategy or in policy areas that fell under the
responsibility of feminist commissioners.
More precisely, the article seeks to explain how positive action was side-
lined after the launch of gender mainstreaming as a result of the specific
way GM was used by the opponents of gender equality to damage the
dynamic created by the successful enlargement of the scope of gender
equality in the Third Community Action Programme (1991–5) and the
expansion of women’s constituency in EU politics enhanced by the inte-
gration of Sweden and Finland.
The conflicts between the two policy frames are manifested in both
implicit and explicit ways throughout the policy cycle. Shifts in policy
frames occur in rhetoric, activities, instruments and mechanisms resulting
in different policy outcomes. Examining the rhetoric and administrative
changes that accompanied the development of the EU gender main-
streaming strategy reveals some of the explicit and implicit obstacles that
confronted gender equality policies in the unique environment of
European policy-making. These include the institutional context of the
powerful and deeply hierarchical European Commission, where top-level
administration and technocratic staff can play a decisive role.
This article is based on analysis of seminal policy documents, like the
1996 Commission Communication, the 1997 European Parliament Resolu-
tion and the 1998 Commission progress report on GM. By reflecting
implicit and subtle shifts in policy frames and discourse, these texts reveal
conflicts and compromises between different political interests, insti-
tutions and policy actors. The texts are placed in the context of changing
policy environments, policy objectives and institutional structures as I
have experienced them during my involvement in the planning and
implementation of GM strategies in the Commission.1 In this context, I
highlight the role of individual key players, politicians and civil servants
in specific political and administrative decisions. I also assess immediate
negative impacts on positive action and discuss the new opportunities
that were opened in some EU policy areas.
European Journal of Women’s Studies 12(2)166
MYTHS AND REALITIES ABOUT GENDER
MAINSTREAMING
Both ‘gender’ and ‘mainstreaming’ are conceptual terms that have evoked
more confusion, misunderstanding and questions than any other terms
used in EU equality policies. Until 1996, there was no clear definition in
Community documents for the term ‘gender mainstreaming’. The range
of interpreted meanings included ‘specific actions targeted to women in
non-equality policies’ and ‘upgrading equality policy to a mainstream
policy’. The approach to GM adopted in this study is based on the widely
accepted definition of the Group of Specialists of the Council of Europe,
which states that: ‘GM is the (re)organisation, improvement, development
and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective
is incorporated in all policies, at all levels and at all stages, by the actors
normally involved in policy-making’ (Council of Europe, 1998: 15). A
similar definition that stresses the importance of the ‘transformation’ of
policies is given by Rees (1998: 40), who considers ‘mainstreaming
equality’ one of the three major tools of sex equality policies, together
with equal treatment legislation and positive action in favour of women.
Gender mainstreaming is the equality policy strategy that has been
most critically assessed by feminists and women’s organizations, who
have pointed to the risks if the conditions for its success are not met and
to the increasing evidence of significant weaknesses in its implemen-
tation. Research has been conducted on its emergence, its criteria for
success and its transposition from one context to another (supranational
to national) and from one administrative level to another (national to
local). The multiple character of GM was highlighted by Vogel-Polsky and
Beauchesne (2001), who added to the already long list of prerequisites,
vast knowledge of the mechanisms of segregation and gender relations, as
well as the capacity to analyse social contracts and policies. One of the
most serious risks here is the gradual substitution of equal treatment
guarantees. GM does not rely on law enforcement mechanisms but
involves long-term transformation of public policies (Liebert, 2002;
Pollack and Hafner-Burton, 2000). By emphasizing the danger of weaken-
ing gender equality policies altogether – a result of GM implementation –
Verloo (2001) argues that given gender power relations, GM becomes a
political process in itself. Woodward (2003) too argues that in settings
where political groups hope to reverse the progress of equality, GM is
employed in questionable ways by dismantling women’s policy machin-
ery and committing no resources in its place.
Gender mainstreaming in the EU gained a high political profile thanks
to its influential role in member states’ equality policies. Research on its
implementation has shown that, taking advantage of the political oppor-
tunities provided by the EU Treaty and the UN Platform for Action,
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supranational networks facilitated the adoption of this new policy
strategy and its revolutionary potential in a wide range of EU policy
fields, thus upgrading the EU to one of the most progressive polities with
respect to the promotion of gender equality (Pollack and Hafner-Burton,
2000). GM was also analysed as a principal (and potentially radical)
instrument towards achieving gender equality and challenging the liberal
concept of equal treatment that views public policies as neutral. However,
it has been argued that it is difficult to implement GM effectively when
embedded cultural values and policy frames remain unquestioned; it is
therefore understandable that women’s organizations remain committed
to grounding gender equality in law (Mazey, 2000, 2002).
Further research has explored parameters of GM efficiency. It was
rightly argued that the effective implementation of GM in the multilevel
Euro-polity can be achieved only if it takes root at all levels of decision-
making; its successful transfer to national and regional levels can be
largely facilitated by knowledge-based inducements, like elite learning
and new governance instruments developed in the EU (Liebert, 2002). A
comparison between GM in the EU and Norway has highlighted the
importance of women in politics both in numbers and influence. This is
the only way to guarantee a persistent active political will that is neces-
sary for confronting everyday administrative and institutional resistance
(Havnør, 2000). Research on GM in EU Structural Funds revealed some
important aspects of the barriers within the European Commission
services and correctly suggested that the ‘European Commission is
stronger on policy formulation than on developing accompanying argu-
ments, procedures and instruments for translating policy into practice.’ It
was further argued that middle management reluctance and rivalry
between services about power made progress dependent on certain
people in the right positions at the right moment (Braithwaite, 2000).
Almost all analyses of GM agree that it is a strategy that complements
but does not replace previous gender-specific equality policies like equal
treatment legislation and positive action. The Council of Europe report
states clearly that specific gender equality policies (legislation, mechan-
isms, actions to address specific women’s interests, research and training)
are a necessary prerequisite for successful implementation of GM
(Council of Europe, 1998: 21). However, in hostile gender equality policy
environments (i.e. patriarchal structures of institutional organizations or
the prevalence of policy objectives contrary to gender equality, etc.), GM
may be conceived and applied as an alternative to positive action and
used to downplay the final overall objective of gender equality. In these
cases, the most important innovative element of GM – the broadening of
the scope and relevance of gender equality to all policies in the effort to
transform them – becomes its major weakness, namely its use as an excuse
for the elimination of gender equality specific policies. Such a risk
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increases in policy environments where these specific policies have been
efficiently implemented and have challenged unequal gender distribution
of economic resources and threatened men’s political power.
The ambivalent outcome of GM, though, deserves more attention and
analysis, as it should not be considered accidental or temporary but rather
inherent and structural. GM challenges the whole policy cycle by intro-
ducing a gendered perspective to all phases, not only in the policy
delivery phase as positive action does; a controversial usage may be the
payoff for a policy shift from ‘equal opportunities for women and men’ to
a ‘gender equality’ approach. One may initially argue that a gendered
perspective to all policies is a more radical approach than applying PA on
the level of individuals and social groups. However, in practice, thorough
GM application becomes an almost Sisyphean mission. Strategies and
policy instruments (even those for gender equality) are shaped within
multiple gender hierarchies and thus become the implicit vehicles of the
reproduction of inequalities. Without simultaneously tackling the
accumulated inequalities between the sexes and reinforcing gender-
specific policies, GM effectiveness cannot be assured.
In current EU public policies and existing gender regimes in member
states, enhancing the complementarity of the two tools not only reduces
risks and distortions, but also contributes to their mutual reinforcement.
GM enlarges the scope of gender equality policies and limits its compart-
mentalization in target groups, policy-making machinery and the allo-
cation of financial and human resources. Parallel positive action increases
women’s visibility and fosters gender equality by being diluted in other
policy objectives or hijacked by other policy priorities. Arguments in
favour of positive action highlight the advantage of introducing clear and
measurable targets for women. Arguments in favour of GM highlight the
importance of challenging the supposedly gender-neutral public policies
with the aim of transforming the basis of analysis, the hypotheses about
the expected impact, as well as the processes of its measures design.
Considering GM and positive action competitive and eventual alterna-
tives negates the multidimensional and structural character of gender
relations and ignores the dangers present in policy environments that
maintain existing gendered hierarchies.
FROM EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES TO GENDER
MAINSTREAMING
In the EU, GM was launched after almost 40 years of equal treatment and
positive action policies in the labour market. First gender equality
concerns were introduced in the form of legislation on equal pay and
equal treatment between women and men in the light of Article 119 of the
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Treaty of Rome and the mobilization of the post-1968 labour and women’s
movement (Hoskyns, 1996). The first area of conflict between supporters
and opponents of gender equality was about whether positive action
should be included in the Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC).
Positive action was dropped during the final negotiations of the Directive,
becoming instead the subject of a Council Recommendation
(84/635/EEC), a soft EU act. In spite of their complementarity, as argued
by feminists and gender experts, positive action was seen as contradicting
equal treatment legislation. Positive action in employment, however, was
promoted though actions supported by the medium-term programmes
for equal opportunities for women; it was initiated in the first action
programme (1982–5) (CEC, 1982) and consolidated in the second
(1986–90) (CEC, 1986).2
Equal opportunities for women in the labour market were promoted
through the specific funding of vocational training and employment
schemes for women by the European Social Fund (ESF), since 1977
already a part of its general policy. Since 1988, ‘equal opportunities
between women and men’ became a specific measure under Objective 3
of the EU Structural policy (Council Regulation 4255/88).3 In its annual
report Employment in Europe, launched in 1989, the Commission admitted
that women’s employment was important for the analysis of the
European labour market and introduced a women’s chapter (CEC, 1989).
It was a newly appointed female commissioner, Vasso Papandreou,4 who
personally insisted on this. A year later, she was instrumental in launch-
ing the most important ESF instrument for gender equality, the
Community Initiative NOW (New Opportunities for Women), which
earmarked a specific budget for women’s vocational training that facili-
tated their integration into the labour market, including childcare infra-
structure.
In 1990, GM was introduced into EU documents as one of the ‘inno-
vative features’ of the third action programme for equal opportunities for
women and men (1991–5) (CEC, 1990: 3); the addition of ‘men’ in its title
was also an innovative feature. Two variants of the definition were
proposed in the programme: (1) ‘to take into account an equal oppor-
tunities dimension and the particular problems encountered by women in
all relevant policies’ and (2) ‘to integrate equality into the general main-
stream policy’. Although the official definitions use ‘gender’ as a
component of GM, they ignore the structural aspect of the term and limit
the description of the problem to ‘differences in opportunities’ as a reason
for women’s particular problems. These definitions characterize the tran-
sitional period – wherein the contextual phase shifted from ‘women’s
dimension’ to ‘gendered dimension’ in the development of gender
equality policies in the EU (Booth and Bennett, 2002). What is further
reflected here is the phraseology used by the two national experts from
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Denmark and the UK (Jacobsen and Brittan, 1989), who prepared the first
draft of the third action programme. Here the ‘new’ tool was named
‘mainstreaming equal opportunities policy’. Labour market and voca-
tional training were the policies of primary concern for GM, although ‘all
relevant policies’ like educational and social policies were also mentioned.
The Equal Opportunities Unit, in charge of the implementation of the
programme, tried to enhance GM by proposing a gender impact assess-
ment of employment policies, similar to the already existing impact
assessment on the small and medium enterprises. As a first step, the Unit
proposed the adoption of a Commission Communication, which,
prepared by an external gender equality expert (Jacqueline Laufer),
argued for the necessity of GM in Community policies and programmes,
especially in employment and labour market policies. The 1993 Danish
presidency had strongly supported it as part of its proposal to the
Commission to take action for mainstreaming employment concerns in all
Community policies; increasing unemployment rates having started to
unsettle policy-makers.5 GM in employment policies was also supported
by the Council Resolution initiated by the Greek presidency, which
extended the scope of equal opportunities to all European Structural
Funds (Council Conclusion 94/C 231/01/22.6.1994). However, this
support did not prevent the draft Communication failing to pass through
a reluctant male hierarchy and be adopted as a formal Commission
document. GM was, in 1993, seen as secondary to what had become the
main focus for DGV hierarchy: to mainstream employment in
Community policies. In the new ‘employment-dominated’ European
agenda created by the Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council,
gender mainstreaming was paradoxically put aside as irrelevant and
luxurious, despite the existing evidence and awareness of the negative
economic impact of the low European female activity rate, especially
when compared to that in the US.
ENHANCING WOMEN’S CONSTITUENCY, THREATENING
MEN’S POLITICAL POWER
Not surprisingly, the Third Community Action Programme had more
success outside the Commission. Strong alliances with women’s
constituencies, in the European Parliament (EP) and the European
Women’s Lobby (EWL),6 as well as with individual women politicians
and gender experts, created a positive environment for gender equality
around the programme and its operational mechanism, the Equal Oppor-
tunities Unit (Stratigaki, 2000). The personal commitment of Agnès
Hubert, head of the Unit from 1992 to 1996, played a crucial role in con-
solidating this alliance, which eventually favoured focusing on other
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innovative features in the programme, namely increasing women in
political decision-making. This policy goal has prevailed in EU gender
equality policies through a wide range of policy instruments, including
background studies, theoretical texts, electoral campaigns, collected
statistics and visibility events (EC, 1997b; Hubert, 1998), as well as a
Council Recommendation (Council, 1996). A group of gender experts
from all member states coordinated action and developed the European
argumentation on gender balance in politics and on gender parity. Further
elaboration on the concept of ‘parity democracy’ allowed the move from
a quantitative claim to a qualitative necessity associated with structural
change (Hubert, 2001). The active political support by the commissioner,
female MEPs and national ministers was crucial in opening a window of
opportunity for positive action for women in politics. An immediate
result of these activities, in particular on the European-wide campaign,
was the increase of women in the EP from 19 percent to 27 percent (after
the 1994 elections and the integration of Sweden and Finland in 1995) and
among European commissioners from one to five (out of 20) in 1995.
One of the five women commissioners was the Swedish newcomer,
Anita Gradin, ex-Minister of Gender Equality and President of the Inter-
national Association of Socialist Women. Her personal commitment to
gender equality justified her request to bring gender equality policy in her
portfolio together with justice and home affairs, both issues being under
the responsibility of the conservative Irish commissioner Pádraig Flynn
since 1993. Eventually, the President of the Commission, Jacques Santer,
chose to keep gender equality policy with the Irish commissioner, whose
interest and degree of commitment to gender equality was later publicly
challenged by the EP Committee on Women’s Rights.7 The pressure and
criticism exercised by the EP urged the president to, instead, extend
responsibility for gender equality to more commissioners and form a
Group of Commissioners for Equality under his chairship. The members
of the group were two men, Pádraig Flynn, in charge of social affairs
(including gender equality) and the Finn Erkii Liikanen, in charge of
personnel policy,8 as well as two women, the German social democrat
Monica Wulf-Mathies, in charge of regional policy, and Anita Gradin.
Unlike other similar groups,9 this group was open to other commissioners
and, once a year, to the presidents of three major bodies representing the
women’s constituency in the EU: the Advisory Committee composed of
national equality machineries, the EP Committee on Women’s Rights and
the EWL. This status was achieved as a result of the increasing political
importance of the issues and the dynamic involvement of political, social
and civil actors with high visibility.
The buoyant environment for gender equality in 1995 was reinforced by
the exciting stir created by the agenda of the UN Fourth World Conference
in Beijing, which urged governments to ‘promote an active and visible
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policy of mainstreaming a gendered perspective in all policies and
programmes, so that, before decisions are taken, an analysis is made of the
effects on women and men, respectively’ (UN, 1996). The EU actively
supported this objective and further consolidated the progress on equality
in Europe far beyond its original intentions as set before the Beijing
Conference by a Communication for this purpose (CEC, 1995a).10 Shortly
after the UN Conference, the Commission adopted two Communications,
one on integrating gender issues in development cooperation (CEC,
1995b) and a second on the external dimension of human rights policy
including women in its target groups (CEC, 1995c). All women commis-
sioners committed themselves to developing GM in the policies of their
respective Community competence. By the same token, the Council of
Ministers also mobilized by adopting two Resolutions on equality issues
beyond the labour market with respect to decision-making and image in
the media (Council, 1995a, 1995b) under the dynamic presidencies of
Simone Veil for France and Cristina Alberti for Spain.
However, in spite of this wide interest in gender equality, the overall
political and administrative responsibility for the EU gender equality
policy was still in the hands of Commissioner Flynn and his Directorate
General Employment and Social Affairs (DGV). All bona fide political will
had to be coordinated, translated into specific policies and consolidated in
Community programmes by allocating human and financial resources
and developing appropriate mechanisms and policy instruments. This
task necessitated substantial administrative changes aimed at creating
and reinforcing existing structures and policy machineries. Specific
equality staff would, then, organize the provision of necessary technical
and theoretical knowledge of gender analysis in respective policy areas by
external experts and researchers.
What effectively happened in DGV went in the opposite direction,
despite the equality-sensitive background of the newly appointed, social-
ist, Director General, Allan Larsson from Sweden. Changes were made
that depoliticized GM implementation, underutilized existing human
resources and reduced the use of external expertise on gender issues.
More precisely, the Equal Opportunities Unit was marginalized with the
removal from office of its head, Agnès Hubert, in April 1996, and the
management of the action programme was externalized to a technical
assistance office, managed by a consortium of companies with no prior
experience or expertise in gender issues.11 In addition, seven out of the
nine gender expert groups operating in different policy areas under the
third action programme, including those on women in decision-making
and positive action, were discontinued, despite the plea of the EP
Committee on Women’s Rights and the EWL. These administrative
decisions, with their important political impact on gender equality
perspectives, were taken after the appointment, in April 1995, of the
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French female Commission official Odile Quintin to the post of Director of
Employment (in DGV), who was in charge of equality policy among
others. One year later she moved to the post of Director of Social Dialogue
(also in DGV) bringing with her the responsibility for the Equal Oppor-
tunities Unit. The full assignment of gender equality policy to her has
contributed to its softening, as Odile Quintin was known in the
Commission to be ambitious and able to reframe EU policies as requested
by her political hierarchy. In this specific period, she was even more effec-
tive because there was a political coincidence with Commissioner Flynn,
who had been renominated for his second term (1995–9) and had relied
upon her experience and professional capacity for the shaping of EU
social policies in accordance with his party politics.
THE LAUNCH OF GM: EMPTY RHETORIC DESPITE
SUPPORTIVE ENVIRONMENT
The high political profile of GM in the EU had created high expectations
among feminists both inside and outside European institutions. The
Commission had to react positively to broad political agreement with
respect to the new strategies, as was advertised in Beijing. Rightly, the
Communication ‘incorporating equal opportunities for women and men
into all community policies and activities’ adopted in February 1996 was
considered a landmark policy document in the EU (CEC, 1996). The defi-
nition of GM in this document states ‘mobilising all general policies and
measures specifically for the purpose of achieving equality by actively and
openly taking into account at the planning stage their possible effects on
the respective situations of women and women (gender perspective)’
(emphasis in the original). The Communication also includes a review of
Community policies including employment, information, education and
development cooperation.
The Communication stressed the importance of the EU policy on equal
opportunities in different policy areas, but failed to address any major
objective, instrument or strategy for implementing GM. In fact, the 1996
Communication was much weaker than the text of the Commission
Communication issued before the UN Conference (CEC, 1995a). In the
latter, women’s participation in political decision-making is a principle
and a strategic objective of Community action, as it is considered an
important indicator of democracy (para. 28). It is also stated that until a
parity democracy is reached, women’s interests must be fully integrated
in general policies (Conclusion). On the contrary, the 1996 Communi-
cation not only failed to add any substantial value but also avoided any
reference to the crucial connection between GM and women’s partici-
pation in decision-making. The text referred more to the importance of the
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involvement of as many actors as possible (with the exception of women
as decision-makers) than to the core element of GM, the transformation of
existing public policies. In the Communication, GM lost most of its
strategic sense vis-a-vis gender equality as it became an abstract ‘prin-
ciple’ used interchangeably with the ‘principle of equality’.
More seriously perhaps, GM was presented as a single concept, with no
accompanying analysis of gender, gender relations, gender impact assess-
ments and other related concepts and instruments. Rather, mainstreaming
came to be connected to some general concepts, such as the ‘new partner-
ship between women and men’ and ‘democracy’, concepts generic
enough to dilute equality instruments and arguments. The Communi-
cation did little to improve readers’ understanding of why and how the
Commission intended to implement a new policy instrument for equality
between women and men. In the examples of equality in EU policies, no
reference was made as to the aims, or the expected outcomes, of incorpo-
rating a gendered dimension. This section of the Communication could
have been part of an ordinary report on equal opportunities as it only
described positive actions in different policy areas. In the concluding
section, an attempt was made to present an implementation strategy for
the principle of mainstreaming in 10 sentences that propose mechanisms
to monitor processes, indicators and procedures and ‘when necessary,
experts’ reports’. No reference was made to a timetable or to the allocation
of funds and human resources.
The drafting of the Communication was assigned by Odile Quintin to
two male officials, one her adviser and the other in charge of the Group of
Commissioners at the General Secretariat. Neither had any prior experi-
ence in dealing with gender equality and they were not exposed to inputs
from the Equal Opportunities Unit, which had followed the work in the
Council of Europe on GM and which could have provided expert knowl-
edge. Inputs from the Unit or external equality experts were rejected by
the director as adopting a ‘women’s ghetto’ approach and thus not
suitable for the new era of GM, which addressed all policies and all actors,
not only equality-focused policies and feminists. This further excluded
the Unit from internal discussions and negotiations before its adoption by
the Commission and legitimized the position that GM could be designed
and implemented by anyone, without recourse to specialists.
The weakness of the Communication both in terms of theory and
implementation provoked immediate reactions in the EP Committee on
Women’s Rights and the EWL. In its pertinent resolution, the EP
contributed considerably to the clarification of strategies and tools by
adopting the majority of the elements stated in the Council of Europe
document. In its report, it argued in favour of the following issues: an
approach that combined GM and positive actions (para. 11), the definition
of assessment criteria (para. 14), the identification of obstacles created by
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culture and rigid societal structures (para. 16), the development of gender-
sensitive indicators (para. 29), the importance of coordination structures
and budget lines within the Commission (para. 39) and the introduction
of a gendered perspective to legislation (para. 43) (EP, 1997). In its
position, the EWL proposed the following definition: ‘the full integration
of the gender perspective into all policy areas by giving equal consider-
ation to the values and needs of both sexes’ and argued in favour of
positive actions, of a special budget for mainstreaming and of completing
mainstreaming with special measures to promote women in decision-
making positions (EWL, 1996).
POSITIVE ACTION AND GENDER EQUALITY SPECIFIC
POLICIES UNDER RISK
The lack of involvement of the Equal Opportunities Unit in the Communi-
cation’s formulation and its adoption, in spite of the critical reactions of
the EP, the EWL and gender experts, indicates that its very weak approach
to the mainstreaming of gender equality was not accidental. What
happened can only be explained by the existence of deliberate opposition
to the full effects of GM, which challenged other interests in the
Commission. The threat of rebalancing the existing gender distribution of
political power in the EU institutions appears to be a decisive facilitator in
this direction. The Kalanke Judgement (European Court of Justice Case
C-450/93) in 1995, which challenged positive action, provided further
backing for this weak approach to GM, in spite of the clear reaction of
women’s constituencies.
Evidence of the use of GM to eliminate positive action can be found in
EU labour market policy texts. The annual Commission report Employ-
ment in Europe included a separate chapter on women’s employment from
1989 until 1993 and applied an ex-post gender proofing of all chapters in
1994. By 1995 both these efforts to introduce equality had been discon-
tinued, with the excuse of applying GM in the drafting of the report. The
synoptic table of all measures adopted by member states to reduce unem-
ployment provides further evidence. The Tableau de Bord, in its 1995
edition, included a separate section on measures aimed at equality for
women and men in the labour market (EC, 1996: 199), whereas, in the 1996
edition, equality measures were integrated in the chapter on measures
addressed to social groups hit by unemployment. This restricted the scope
of equality measures from those covering the labour market as a whole to
those covering unemployed women, a fact that was justified in the
forwarding address on the basis of GM (EC, 1997a). The trend to prioritize
socially excluded groups instead of women as a whole was exemplified in
the case of Community Initiative EQUAL, which aimed at combating
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discrimination in the labour market. EQUAL replaced programmes
targeting women in general (NOW and EMPLOYMENT-NOW). All of
EQUAL’s projects were invited to mainstream gender equality, while
specific funds were targeted only at socially excluded women, namely
single parents or parental leave users.
In the field of education, a ring-fenced budget was allocated to projects
aimed at equality between women and men and gender sensitization in
the field of education, which addressed gender stereotypes, school materi-
als and the promotion of non-typical educational choices for girls and
boys. This budget was managed in close association with the Equal
Opportunities Unit, ensuring a global coherence of the policy. In 1996, this
specific budget was discontinued with the argument that the new
programme for higher education, SOCRATES,12 had mainstreamed
gender equality (CEC, 1998: 9).
In the same vein, all forms of gender equality mechanisms armed with
distinctive human and financial resources were put in question. The EP
Committee on Women’s Rights was challenged as to its necessity, role and
added value in the EU policy agenda. It survived after the restructuring
of the EP committees in 1998, thanks to strong advocacy exerted by its
Green Finnish president, Heidi Hautala, actively supported by most of its
Socialist Members. However, the new Committee was renamed ‘Commit-
tee on Women’s Rights and Equal Opportunities’, signifying the shift from
focusing on women to including men in its scope.13
The fourth action programme for equal opportunities (1996–2000)
survived as it adopted GM as its main objective and became the vehicle
for its promotion (CEC, 1995d). Consequently, there was a clear shift in
how and to whom the action programme’s limited available funding was
allocated. Till 1995, equality projects funded by the action programmes
were primarily small, transnational projects initiated and implemented by
women’s organizations throughout the EU, covering the whole range of
the programme objectives. From 1996, funding was addressed to large-
scale projects proposed and implemented by non-specific organizations
such as social partners and local authorities. This deprived EU gender
equality policy from the energy and enthusiasm of feminists and of an
important and useful input by the highly mobilized women’s civil society.
NEW OPPORTUNITIES BY INTRODUCING A ‘DUAL
STRATEGY’
Trying to identify and tackle weak spots in the GM application in line
with the criticisms of the EP and the EWL, the staff of the Equal Oppor-
tunities Unit eventually settled for the ‘dual strategy’ or ‘twin track’
approach (combining GM and specific actions), as the only possible
Stratigaki: Gender Mainstreaming vs Positive Action 177
remedy that could rebalance the shift in equality policy frames. Only two
years after the Commission Communication, the same Commission
adopted the first progress report on the follow-up of the Communication
(CEC, 1998). This time the report was prepared by the Unit and by the
Norwegian national expert, Anne Havnør, whose contribution was crucial
in the monitoring by a Commission inter-service group on this issue from
1996 to 1999. The report was clearly far more critical than the 1996
Communication in terms of gender equality, and recognized the import-
ance of a ‘dual strategy’. ‘Programmes, positive action measures and
budget lines/budgetary allocations specifically targeted to equal oppor-
tunities should complement the mainstreaming approach’ (CEC, 1998: 7).
A high level of commitment, awareness, gender expertise and monitoring
and evaluation (gender impact assessment and gender proofing) were
identified as conditions of success for GM. At the same time, a new, more
comprehensive definition of the concept was introduced in the EU
glossary on equality as follows: ‘the systematic integration of the respec-
tive situations, priorities and needs of women and men in all policies and
with a view to promoting equality between women and men and mobil-
ising all general policies and measures specifically for the purpose of
achieving equality by actively and openly taking into account, at the
planning stage, their effects on the respective situations of women and
men in implementation, monitoring and evaluation’ (EC, 1998: 29).
A dual strategy approach was already partially reflected in the Treaty of
Amsterdam, following a systematic campaigning and the multilevel
action coordination by the EWL that maximized the opportunities offered
by the ‘window of reform’ opened by the 1996 Intergovernmental
Conference (Helfferich and Kolb, 2000). This resulted in Article 2, stating
that equality between women and men is a Community task, and Article
3, stating, ‘Community shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote
equality, between women and men’. Article 141.4 allowed ‘specific advan-
tages . . . for the underrepresented sex’ (EU, 1997). The scope of this
positive development is, however, limited by the fact that these provisions
do not provide strong legal bases, leaving the larger part of responsibility
for their implementation upon political will and a favourable policy
environment.
The dual strategy was launched and promoted as a remedy by feminist
EU officials, whereas it was effectively implemented by feminist poli-
ticians. In particular, there were three women commissioners, who
exploited contradictory policy frames by largely using Commission
rhetoric and official documents, including the 1996 Communication, in
legitimizing their equality policies. Three policy areas, two new to
equality (EU research and technology policy, and home affairs and
justice) and one old area (EU structural policy), fell under the political
responsibility of socialist women commissioners, the French Edith
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Cresson, the Swedish Anita Gradin and the German Monica Wulf-
Mathies. They succeeded in mobilizing women’s constituencies (includ-
ing in the EP and the EWL) and built up a policy environment attuned to
enhancing gender equality in the EU.
Edith Cresson initiated policies challenging the under representation of
women in research and technology. Among her first decisions was to
launch Marie Curie student scholarships, open to students of both sexes
but with a name likely to encourage girls to apply. In 1999, a clear EU
strategy and action plan on ‘Women in Science’ was launched, as part of
EU research and technology policy. This recognized the need to promote
research ‘by, for and about women’ and has become the best example in
the EC of combining both positive action and GM measures (CEC, 1999).
Despite the opposing opinion of the Commission’s legal service, Anita
Gradin managed to establish the issue of the trafficking of women in the
agenda of home affairs policies and, in 1997, launched the DAPHNE
initiative,14 aiming at combating violence against women. Her action
exemplified the potential of EU policy among women and a feminist
constituency. Monica Wulf-Mathies was influential in introducing a GM
strategy in the EU Structural Funds policy and allocated specific funds to
tackling women’s low participation in the labour market and the high
female unemployment rate. The subsequent regulation of the European
Structural Funds for the period 2000–6 (Council, 1999) integrated a dual
track strategy, as well as a series of well-founded instruments and moni-
toring mechanisms.15
Further evidence of the influence of individual women politicians insti-
gating specific action for gender equality, along with GM, is the case of the
Framework Strategy for Gender Equality (2001–5) (EC, 2001). The Frame-
work Strategy was adopted thanks to the personal commitment of
Commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou (who replaced P. Flynn for the
employment and social affairs portfolio in 2000) and Barbara Helfferich,
member of her cabinet and formerly General Secretary of the European
Women’s Lobby. In the then current political and administrative environ-
ment of DGV, it was envisaged to discontinue the long tradition of mid-
term action programmes with the excuse of gender mainstreaming. The
adoption of the Framework Strategy programme was a marked success in
this difficult environment, and made clear progress in the EU discourse on
gender equality by structuring the policy around five areas of gender
equality active citizenship: economic, political, social, cultural and civil.
These positive developments of EU gender equality policy were built
upon a favourable international environment in the late 1990s, but they
were too dependent on the political will of individual women politicians.
The transformative effect of GM on the respective policy processes and
mechanisms was far too limited, and was lost with the departure of the
women politicians and technocrats who had initiated and supported
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these policies.16 The persistence of equality priorities in the agenda seems
to be easier when gender equality objectives coincide with other, stronger
EU policy priorities, as it was demonstrated in the case of EU policies for
work–family balance (Stratigaki, 2004); this gender equality concept was
coopted by economic priorities and shifted in meaning and expected
policy outcome. Cooptation by economic priorities seems to be the case
also for women-targeted labour market measures and GM in the guide-
lines of the European Employment Strategy. These measures proved,
eventually, insufficient to prevent the regression in some aspects of
women’s situation, as shown by the appearance of new gender in-
equalities in the form of women’s proliferation in part-time and
temporary jobs.
CONCLUSION
The article has explored the emergence of GM in the EU and analysed the
steps both forwards and backwards for gender equality as an outcome of
the underlying conflict between GM and positive action. It has pointed
out the important role of institutional and administrative changes, as well
as of women politicians, in enhancing gender equality policy, taking into
consideration the patriarchal culture of European institutions and the
mobilization of women’s constituencies. It has demonstrated that the
transformative effect of GM was minimal and its application has led to
contradictory results. It opened important opportunities for specific
policies in new policy areas, whereas in others it diluted positive action.
On the positive side, by implementing GM, the EU gender equality
policy frame was extended beyond equal treatment legislation and
positive actions; the neutrality of all policies at all levels was questioned
and new directions for policy change were introduced. The potential of a
more radical analysis of policies through a gendered perspective chal-
lenged the status quo in the EU policy system and invited strong resist-
ance to understanding and endorsing the new equality strategy.
Male-dominated decision-making bodies of the European Commission
welcomed and constructed rhetoric on GM, which accommodated a
current political environment in alignment with women’s enthusiasm.
However, they showed blatant reluctance in implementing this equality
policy due to conflicting policy frames. One of the ways to disguise this
reluctance was to insidiously assign GM the role of eroding positive
action. This necessitated conceptual and perceptual shifts deliberately put
forward in official texts.
Examination of EU official texts on GM, as presented in this article,
exemplifies the way EU policy discourse may evolve rhetoric devoid of
substance with regard to political commitment and concrete policy
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instruments and measures. The texts and the administrative and insti-
tutional changes observed reveal underlying policy interests and inten-
tions by policy-makers; specific words are selected and specific
technocratic decisions are taken. The analysis showed the role (and
power) of the high and middle management of a bureaucratic structure,
which drafted documents, selected words, manipulated meanings,
delegated powers to individuals and shaped women’s constituencies’
expectations. Reading between the lines of the 1996 Communication
suggests that it was conceived less to increase the speed of gender
equality policies and more to hamper progress. It was also felt (and often
internally argued) that the ambiguous and feeble rhetoric of the
Communication risked setting back gender equality in the EU: (1) it
incited arguments against positive action by stressing the concern of all
actors for gender equality (a job for everybody = a job of nobody); (2) it
undermined radical elements of GM, such as the process of transform-
ation of policies and the role of female decision-makers in implementing
it; and (3) it halted the post-Beijing Conference dynamic and the
momentum gathered following the enlargement to the North.17
Analysis of the barriers to implementing GM shows that the problem
was not that it was newly established and needed a ‘period of grace’ for
policy actors to assimilate it. Barriers are primarily erected because GM is
infiltrated by feminist concerns suggesting fundamental changes in ways
of thinking and understanding society. GM can potentially challenge and
transform gender-biased public policies. However, this policy goal inter-
feres and clashes with other dominant policy frames of the EU based on
hierarchical gender distribution of power. Conflicts between political
powers, civil society interests and national identities across EU insti-
tutions over competencies and territories produce unexpected effects on
certain policy areas. The article has shown that the concept of GM was
formally fully endorsed by policy-makers, but its implementation was
manipulated so that it served to counteract the emerging demand of
women for binding positive action measures in decision-making bodies.
Challenging the gender distribution of political power in EU institutions
threatens personal interests and power positions of individual women
and men who held specific posts in political and administrative hierar-
chies. As a result, conflicting interests marginalized some individual
policy-makers and crucial prerequisites for GM like women’s partici-
pation in decision-making, equality-focused policies and the allocation of
funds and human resources remained on the margins of the scope of the
policy agenda for gender equality.
Today, eight years after its launch, GM has so far failed to affect core
policy areas or radically transform policy processes within the European
institutions. Despite the existence of strong alliances among equality-
focused institutional mechanisms, bodies of women’s constituencies and
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the abundance of EU official declarations and political commitments,
central policy documents (annual programmes, budgets and legislation)
remain largely outside the scope of the strategy. Gender equality is still
kept outside the debate (and action) with regard to the core of EU policies,
macroeconomic policies enforcing the European Monetary Union
(Hoskyns, 2004) and the constitutional politics shaping European polity
(Lombardo, 2005). Contrary to most expectations (and explicitly formu-
lated demands), analysis of the Commission’s White Paper on European
governance and the work of the European Convention demonstrate the
marginalization of feminist politics in these two cases (Shaw, 2002). The
resistance to including gender equality among EU values in the Consti-
tutional Treaty shows that difficulties persist. Feminist strategies may
have to be revisited in terms of both modes of acting and modes of theor-
izing. They may have to rely more on the knowledge of how power, struc-
tures and individuals interact and how this frames EU policies and
discourse. This knowledge may assist in preventing transformative GM
from being a failed project. It may also assist in exploring the way that
gender equality and European integration will intertwine more effectively
in shaping identities and foster economic, political and social change, as
argued by Hubert (1998).
NOTES
The author thanks Mary Braithwaite, Anne Havnør, Catherine Hoskyns, Agnès
Hubert and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions
on former versions of the article.
1. I worked in the Equal Opportunities Unit of the European Commission
from 1991 to 1999.
2. For a comparative analysis of EU action programmes on equal oppor-
tunities, see Hoskyns (2000).
3. For a detailed analysis of GM in the Structural Funds, see Braithwaite
(2000).
4. Vasso Papandreou and Cristiane Scrivener were the first two women to be
appointed to the post of European commissioner by Jacques Delors in 1988.
5. This concern eventually produced the EU White Paper Competitiveness,
Growth and Employment (EC, 1994).
6. The EWL is a Europe-wide umbrella organization consisting of about 3000
women’s organizations in all member states. The EU financially supports its
operation.
7. Criticism by the EP Committee chaired by the Dutch Green MEP Nel van
Dijk included reference to Flynn’s public attack of Mary Robinson during
her campaign for president in Ireland.
8. One can assume that under the combined influence of belonging to this
group and coming from a gender-supportive national culture, Erkii
Liikanen was particularly attentive to the promotion of women in the
management posts in the Commission.
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9. Created in the wake of the one on Equal Opportunities, these other
groups were formalized only in 1999 (President’s Communication (SEC
(1999) 1483).
10. A separate acknowledgement must be made to the Swedish delegation in
Beijing, which actively influenced the EU position towards buttressing GM
in EU policy.
11. Currently being sued by the Commission for mismanagement.
12. Launched by Decision 819/95/EC and amended by Decision 98/576/EC of
the EP and the Council.
13. Under the influence of Anna Karamanou, who chaired the Committee from
2002 to 2004 and had once more to argue for keeping a Committee dedicated
to women’s rights, the name has been changed again. In the sixth legislature
of the EP, it is ‘the Committee for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality’.
14. The DAPHNE initiative (1997–9) initiated funding of measures combating
violence against children, young persons and women. The consequent
DAPHNE programme (2000–3) was launched by Decision 293/2000 and
DAPHNE II programme (2004–8) by Decision 803/2004/EC of the EP and
the Council.
15. This had an extremely important positive impact on member states, in
particular on those whose labour market policies depend to a great degree
on EU funding such as Greece (EYSEKT, 2003).
16. Current rumours about discontinuation of specific gender equality action
programmes with the excuse of the newly established European Gender
Institute support this fear.
17. Swedish and Finnish women’s organizations were too much ‘newcomers’ to
prevent distortion of positive Nordic influence. Nordic women were facing
EU policies with scepticism, which was fully understandable in the context
of the Scandinavian social welfare system.
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